{"id":1184,"date":"2021-04-30T06:22:38","date_gmt":"2021-04-30T05:22:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/?p=1184"},"modified":"2026-10-15T17:30:00","modified_gmt":"2026-10-15T16:30:00","slug":"libya-the-government-of-national-unity-an-opportunity-for-peace-after-ten-years-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/libya-the-government-of-national-unity-an-opportunity-for-peace-after-ten-years-of-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Libya, the Government of National Unity, an opportunity for peace after ten years of war?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

(Input from Sarah Feuer, Ben Fishman, Wolfgang Pusztai, and Aude Thomas is taken from e-mail interviews that these four experts have given to the author in exclusive for this Catalonia Global Institute article.)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya, marred by a decade of armed conflict and division, <\/span>has sworn in<\/span><\/a> an interim unity government led by businessman <\/span>Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.<\/span> He is expected to replace two rival cabinets that have dominated the North African country\u2019s west and east respectively, each with different foreign backers, since 2014. The new Government of National Unity (GNU) stems from talks initiated in November 2020 at the UN-sponsored <\/span>Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and<\/span> will be responsible for restarting reconstruction efforts <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>including economy, infrastructures, and administration \u2014 and preparing the way towards the December 24th general election. <\/span>Still, substantial challenges remain, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>and many of them have to do with the geopolitical implications of the process. Over the years the conflict has increasingly become <\/span>a proxy war<\/span><\/a> between rival regional powers.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A 10-year, multi-faceted conflict<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the context of the so-called \u201cArab Spring\u201d, the regime of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, who had ruled unchallenged since 1969, was toppled by an armed rebellion in 2011, leading to the First Libyan Civil War. However,\u00a0 this did not bring about the substitution of one stable regime by another, but instead opened the way to factional violence (2011-2014), and subsequently to a Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020). <\/span>T<\/span>o summarise, <\/span>\u00a0the whole process resulted in the country\u2019s division between <\/span>the western region of Tripolitania, ruled by the Government of National Accord (GNA), and the eastern region of Cyrenaica, under the control of a Tobruk-based government – more formally, the Second Abdullah Al-Thani Cabinet.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Tripoli-based GNA was initially meant to be the unified government of Libya under the auspices of a United Nations-led effort in 2015 (the so-called Libyan Political Agreement). It thus received official recognition from the UN itself, and from the EU. Domestically backed by an array of local militias and some remnants of the Libyan Army, it enjoyed foreign support from Turkey, Qatar, and <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>at certain times \u2014 <\/span>Italy. Meanwhile, the Tobruk government in the east did not join the GNA, it continued to exert control over the eastern regions <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>including the armed forces loyal to it, the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by former general Halifa Khaftar <\/span>\u2014<\/span> and was supported by Egypt, the UAE, France, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Libya\u2019s mostly barren southern two-thirds <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>the southwestern Fezzan region and the southern lands of Cyrenaica \u2014<\/span> several local armed groups emerged with their own agendas. They<\/span> play a critical role for whoever wishes to control the area, including its oil industry and its smuggling and trafficking routes crossing into neighboring countries. Some of these groups are Tuareg or Tebu, who have links to their cross-border ethnic kin in Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Chad, and independently <\/span>negotiate their alliances<\/span><\/a> with either of the aforementioned blocs, also shifting them if in their interest.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The infighting came against the background of a volatile situation on the ground in which hundreds, if not thousands, of militias operate, mirroring Libya\u2019s diverse geography and social fabric. Libya <\/span>is arguably<\/span><\/a> the North African country with the weakest sense of nationhood and state-building process over the last decades. Demands for autonomy have been voiced by Tuareg and Tebu leaders, as well as by an Amazigh local council in the Nafusa mountains; in Cyrenaica, calls for federalism or even secession can be heard from time to time.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

All fed up\u00a0 with\u00a0 the decade-long division and infighting<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against that background, American diplomat Stephanie Williams, the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Libya, launched the <\/span>LPDF as a s<\/span>eries of Libyan domestic talks in which representatives from all regions ultimately agreed on a mechanism to select a unified executive authority for the war-ravaged country. <\/span>Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh (Tripolitania) was elected as the new prime minister, while <\/span>Mohamed al-Menfi (Cyrenaica), Musa al-Koni (Fezzan) and <\/span>Abdullah Hussein Al-Lafi (Tripolitania)<\/span> were selected as Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Presidential Council.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Divisi\u00f3
Llegenda: verd<\/em> Govern d’Acord Nacional; vermell<\/em> Govern de Tobruk; blau<\/em> m\u00edlicies locals. Cr\u00e8dits: Wikipedia\u00a0<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How can we explain that the UN-sponsored Libyan initiative has yielded positive results in such a relatively short period of time? According to <\/span>Wolfgang Pusztai<\/span><\/a>, senior advisor at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES), the military stalemate between the LNA and the GNA forces, the \u201cbroad desire of the Libyan population for an end of fighting and a political change\u201d and the \u201cpersistence\u201d of Stephanie Williams with the LPDF approach, \u201cregardless of several setbacks,\u201d are to be credited. Moreover, \u201cthe willingness by many Libyans and by the international community to accept several shortcomings of the incoming government [the GNU] in order to replace two corrupt governments,\u201d namely the GNA and the Tobruk-based government, \u201cby one government, even if this starts off with a vote-buying affair,\u201d has also helped.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, the new interim government has an enormous task before it. \u201cThe GNU\u2019s main challenge at the domestic level will be to provide security and prevent renewed clashes between local armed groups in Tripolitania, which have a tendency to use violence in the absence of a common enemy \u2013 namely Khalifa Haftar,\u201d argues <\/span>Aude Thomas<\/span><\/a>, research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strat\u00e9gique (FRS), as \u201carmed groups will most certainly fight to keep their privilege and position within strategic institutions.\u201d Along with the need to \u201ccope with the Covid-19 pandemic\u201d in a country where \u201cmedical infrastructures have suffered a lack of investment and numerous shelling during armed combat,\u201d Thomas underlines that \u201cthe GNU will also have to avoid being the instrument of local rivalry \u2013 a difficult task knowing the cabinet was constituted in order to reach a balance of power between Libya\u2019s three regions to prevent any political deadlock.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the longer run, \u201cfuture arrangements reflecting the makeup of Libya and its political representation need to be decided through a transparent national process, whether it is through a renewed National Dialogue that was aborted when Haftar attacked Tripoli in April 2019, through the recent LPDF, which the UN convened specifically to be geographically inclusive, a constitutional referendum, or some other format,\u201d says <\/span>Ben Fishman<\/span><\/a>, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute. \u201cWhat seems clear from the vast majority of Libyans, even the so-called federalists who seek relative autonomy in the East, is that they want to keep Libya as a unified country. It will take some time to work out the specific political and economic arrangements for regions, sub-regions, and minority groups.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

An opportunity for Turkey\u2019s Blue Homeland doctrine?<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet another essential factor for Libya\u2019s division is the fact that, over the last ten years, several powers have tried to fill the vacuum and seize the opportunities created in Libya. Some of them are seeking to rejuvenate and assert their centuries-old influence over the country <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>such as Italy, Turkey, or Egypt \u2014<\/span> to which an array of other countries, such as France, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates, must be added.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this point, it would appear that Turkey might be getting the upper hand in Libya. On the one hand, the man elected as the new prime minister of Libya, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as well as other members of his family have business ties to Turkey and hails from Misrata, a city known <\/span>for its longstanding links<\/span><\/a> with Turkey<\/span> dating back to Ottoman times. On the other hand, Turkey\u2019s successful<\/span> military intervention in the Libyan war during 2020 was critical to allow GNA forces to put an end to Khalifa Haftar\u2019s offensive in Tripolitania. Turkish drones \u2014 which were crucial also for Azerbaijan\u2019s victory over Armenian forces in the 2020 Karabakh war \u2014 <\/span>have been credited<\/span><\/a> as a game-changer in the conflict leading to the GNA\u2019s victory over Haftar in Tripolitania. In this, Turkey has managed to stop military penetration by Russia \u2014 which allegedly sent in mercenaries via the Wagner Group, a private contractor <\/span>closely linked to the Russian state<\/b><\/a> \u2014<\/span> into Libya\u2019s west, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>and the UAE, which in their turn had supplied Haftar\u2019s forces with drones.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c<\/span>Turkey has a deep strategic interest in a long-term relationship with Libya,\u201d says Ben Fishman, \u201cnot just for security commitments, but for economic and commercial opportunities. They are looking to restore billions of dollars in pre-revolution contracts, which they maintained both in the west and east of the country.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it is still far from clear whether Dbeibeh\u2019s election heralds a period of Turkish hegemony in Libya. It must be recalled that the GNU is but an interim government that is expected to be replaced by another after the December 2021 election. <\/span>Lacking a strong power base<\/span><\/a>, Dbeibeh and Mohamed al-Menfi \u201chave raised no serious concerns among any of the rival parties,\u201d as both \u201care seen as blank pages that each party hopes to fill in line with its interests,\u201d writes Turkish foreign policy analyst Fehim Tastekin <\/span>in this Al-Monitor column<\/span><\/a>. <\/span>According to Turkish state-run Anadolu Agency<\/span><\/a>, Dbeibeh has also re-committed to <\/span>the November 2019 maritime deal<\/span><\/a> that the GNA signed with Turkey. The agreement was very controversial and was reported as being a violation of the Law of the Sea Convention by all of Turkey\u2019s Mediterranean neighbours. The deal builds on Turkey\u2019s Mavi Vatan, or Blue Homeland, concept. \u201cAccording to this doctrine, islands do not have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but only 6 nautical miles of territorial waters. Consequently, all the Greek Islands, and even Cyprus, would not have an EEZ,\u201d explains Wolfgang Pusztai.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Zona Econ\u00f2mica Exclusiva acordada entre L\u00edbia i Turquia en el marc de la doctrina “P\u00e0tria Blava”. Cr\u00e8dit Wikipedia<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such an approach means that, in Turkey\u2019s eyes, its potential EEZ <\/span>spans well into the middle of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea<\/span><\/a> and shares a maritime border with Libya\u2019s EEZ, to the detriment of Greece and Egypt. Unsurprisingly, these two countries, as well as Cyprus, deem the Blue Homeland doctrine as aggressive, amid <\/span>Turkey\u2019s increasing aspirations to become a regional power<\/span>. \u201cThe Mavi Vatan doctrine is a key element in President Erdogan’s strategy for Turkey\u2019s economic recovery – gas exploration- and the expansion of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the Black Sea,\u201d says Pusztai, who argues this is why the 2019 deal \u201cis an important strategic end for Turkey and a centrepiece in its Libya policy. As the\u00a0 coast facing Turkey in Libya is in eastern Libya, in Cyrenaica, it is crucial for Turkey that Libya remains a unified state ruled by a friendly government.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foreign presence (and military division) set to last on the ground<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One month before the <\/span>LPDF was launched, delegates on behalf of the GNA\u2019s Libyan Army and of Tobruk\u2019s Libyan National Army <\/span>reached a ceasefire deal<\/span><\/a> in Geneva under UN auspices. The deal set a three-month deadline for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters. But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo<\/span>\u011f<\/span>an <\/span>recently signalled<\/span><\/a> he was unwilling to do so until all other foreign actors <\/span>\u2014 <\/span>namely Russia, the UAE, and Egypt \u2014 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>do the same, <\/span>and even told France \u2014\u00a0 also Ankara\u2019s rival in Libya \u2014 to withdraw its forces from several Sahel countries.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c<\/span>France\u2019s main interest in Libya is security for the EU’s southern flank and for operations conducted by the French army in the Sahel region,\u201d points out Aude Thomas, who says the new government\u00a0 \u201cgives a chance to France to regain influence\u201d in Libya, \u201cdamaged by Paris\u2019s support to Khalifa Haftar during the 2019 campaign against Tripoli.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c<\/span>Southern Libya, especially the southwestern province Fezzan, has a key function for the stability of the wider southern Sahara region,\u201d coincides Pusztai. \u201cCurrently Fezzan serves more or less as a safe haven for groups like AQIM or the Islamic State, who are active in Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This is also the main driving element for the French involvement in Libya, as terrorists from Fezzan are harming vital French interests in neighboring countries (e.g. the uranium mines in Niger). Consequently, as Haftar\u2019s Libyan National Army has at least loose control over wide areas of the south, the French have counterterrorism cooperation with him,\u201d the AIES advisor says. <\/span>The reopening of the French embassy in Libya<\/span><\/a>, seven years after being closed, signals the renewed importance that Paris gives the country, and especially the new opportunities that can open up with the GNU.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As regards Italy, and in addition to historic reasons <\/span>dating back to colonial times<\/span><\/a>, \u201cby virtue of geographic proximity, energy, security, and migrant concerns,\u00a0 [it] will continue to play an important role in Libya,\u201d says Fishman. The central Mediterranean route, which connects the Libyan and Tunisian coasts to Italy, \u201chas been one of the most active and dangerous routes for people crossing to Europe by sea,\u201d with a record 181,000\u00a0 maritime arrivals in Italy in 2016, <\/span>ACAPS reports<\/span><\/a>. Control over this route is deemed strategic by Rome. Besides, Italian companies<\/span> \u2014 <\/span>oil and gas company Eni at the fore<\/span> \u2014 <\/span>have huge economic interests both in Libya\u2019s western and eastern regions. This and the fact that Italy\u2019s<\/span> \u201c<\/span>diplomats are some of the most familiar with Libya\u2019s complex dynamics,\u201d as Fishman puts it, help explain Italy\u2019s somewhat ambiguous stance during the conflict, mostly supporting the GNA while at the same time cultivating relations with Haftar. Rome <\/span>also has reasons to partner<\/span><\/a> on the one hand with<\/span> Ankara while on the other with Paris, which adds to Italy\u2019s ambiguous position. But also taking advantage of this, \u201cItaly can play a leading role in pressing for unified EU support to Libya in this sensitive stage of the transition,\u201d Fishman considers.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It has emerged that Ankara might accept sending home Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries deployed in Libya. \u201cTo have a long-term and responsible relationship with the new Libya government, [the Turks] have to fully support the UN peace process and start by withdrawing Turkish-backed mercenaries,\u201d argues Fishman. \u201cMost probably [it would be] a gesture of goodwill to ease tension with the EU and Biden\u2019s administration to prevent additional sanctions\u201d, says Thomas, but the FRS fellow believes the Turks would still keep their own forces on the ground \u201cto strengthen their military footprint\u201d in Al-Watiyah, Misrata and Khoms. \u201cThe same logic applies to Wagner. They have consolidated their presence in eastern and southern Libya where oil fields and strategic military bases are located. As for the UAE, I don\u2019t believe they will leave Libya to the Turks. They have reportedly established strong ties with Sudanese armed groups and discussed recently their longstanding presence in Libya.<\/span>\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Thomas believes that \u201cfor now, we will observe a continued military division\u201d of Libya, as \u201cthe GNU objective \u2014 as stated by Prime Minister Dbeibeh \u2014 is to avoid renewed clashes between the east and west during this transitional period.\u201d On the other hand, even if Haftar has not been awarded a post in the GNU, he is widely expected to seek control of the future Ministry of Defence. \u201cThe subject,\u201d the FRS researcher argues, \u201cis too sensitive and complicated to be solved in upcoming months.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, a rapid withdrawal of all or most foreign military actors should not be counted on. \u201cI believe the foreign presence is expected to last. It might be eased in the upcoming weeks or months, but won\u2019t vanish for sure,\u201d concludes Thomas, as regional powers \u201chave invested a lot and thus will not leave without compensation (contracts, military bases\u2026)\u201d. Libya represents a significant market for reconstruction projects. Those forces \u201calso represent a guarantee for local actors should the political process fail,\u201d the FRS researcher argues.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

And indeed, to what extent is this political process in danger of failing? Or rather, does the GNU\u00a0 have better prospects to survive and unify the country than the GNA had in 2015? \u201c<\/span>My sense of developments in Libya these days is that the newly established GNU may manage to succeed where previous governing structures failed, but only if it garners a more widespread legitimacy within Libya (in both the east and west), something its predecessor, the GNA, sorely lacked. It will also be necessary to reduce the influence of foreign actors such as Turkey, the UAE, and especially Russia,\u201d research fellow at Israel\u2019s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) <\/span>Sarah Feuer<\/span><\/a> argues. \u201c[But] I don\u2019t see much indication from Russia and other outside actors that they intend to reduce their presence. A key dynamic to watch will be Russian-Turkish coordination.\u201d Interestingly, the same can be said of other regional scenarios, such as Syria or the Caucasus.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A couple of issues to reflect on in Catalonia<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As seen, the Libyan case shows how actors sharing a place in first-order international alliances (EU and NATO) can lend support to different or opposing sides in conflicts, even<\/span> \u2014 or because of that \u2014<\/span> if they are close to their borders. This is the case for Italy and France, who appear to have subordinated their role in those alliances to their own national interests, following clearly different strategies <\/span>\u2014<\/span> even if, to do that, they needed to support a non-UN recognised actor, such as France with Haftar.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, Libya has become yet another scenario in which the powers on which Catalonia\u2019s international action has traditionally set its eyes\u00a0 <\/span>\u2014 the EU and the United States \u2014 are of relative importance vis-a-vis other (re)emerging actors such as Turkey, Russia, or the UAE.\u00a0 As is happening in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, this string of actors, can be in such a strong position that it allows them to determine the course of the conflict, in the face of a diminished influence \u2014 whatever the reasons \u2014 of the western powers.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

David Forni\u00e8s is a journalist specializing in international politics with a focus on diversity.\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

(Input from Sarah Feuer, Ben Fishman, Wolfgang Pusztai, and Aude Thomas is taken from e-mail interviews that these four experts have given to the author in exclusive for this Catalonia Global Institute article.) Libya, marred by a decade of armed conflict and division, has sworn in an interim unity government led by businessman Abdul Hamid … Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":1182,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[36,45],"tags":[],"tipus_publicacio":[267],"class_list":["post-1184","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-africa-en","category-middle-east-and-north-africa","tipus_publicacio-analysis","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-2"],"acf":{"document_pdf":null,"disclaimer":false},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1184","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1184"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1184\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2980,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1184\/revisions\/2980"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1182"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1184"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1184"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1184"},{"taxonomy":"tipus_publicacio","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cgi.erigin.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tipus_publicacio?post=1184"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}